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INTRODUCTION
Conveying property in Appalachia can be somewhat like a box of
chocolates: “You never know what you’re gonna get.”1 Carved by
ancient rivers and winding streams, the seemingly never-ending
“hollers”2 and hills of Appalachia can disorient even the best
navigator. Couple the region’s rugged topography with an already
ambiguous demarcation system, and properties once mapped by
metes and bounds descriptions become impossible to re-create with
any sort of certainty.3 Thus, though rooted in a desire for clarity,4
the combination of mountainous terrain and imperfect demarcation
results in a property system riddled with ambiguity.
Due to this inherent definitional problem in Appalachian land,
the lines on a map do not always align with widespread local
knowledge. The result is even further uncertainty, as variances
between local understandings of place and federally standardized
definitions of property cause confusion over which definition is
correct, a problem this Note defines as “vertical ambiguity.” When
such variances find their way into property descriptions, one’s
answer—local or federal—can determine whether entire parcels of
land are transferred. The question then becomes how to properly
make that choice. This Note offers a clear answer: when such
conflicts arise, there should be a presumption in favor of local
knowledge.

1. Eric Roth, Forrest Gump, DAILYSCRIPT.COM, dailyscript.com/scripts/forrest_gump.html
[https://perma.cc/TDM3-E4VV].
2. See Chi Luu, The Legendary Language of the Appalachian “Holler,” JSTOR DAILY
(Aug. 8, 2018), https://daily.jstor.org/the-legendary-language-of-the-appalachian-holler/
[https://perma.cc/9TXJ-D6WZ] (discussing the history of the Appalachian dialect and noting
the Appalachian use of “holler” for the common-English word “hollow”).
3. See Gary D. Libecap & Dean Lueck, The Demarcation of Land and the Role of Coordinating Property Institutions, 119 J. POL. ECON. 426, 428 (2011) (noting the innate inconsistencies in metes and bounds property descriptions and how irregularity only increases in
mountainous terrain).
4. See Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 687 (1979) (recognizing a “special
need for certainty and predictability where [property is] concerned”).

Published by William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository, 2021

3

William & Mary Law Review Online, Vol. 62 [2021], Art. 4

74

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW ONLINE

[Vol. 62:071

In most areas, local and federal definitions of place match.5
Largely due to the success of the U.S. Board on Geographic Names
(BGN), the federal entity tasked with the responsibility of standardizing domestic geographic names, there is general uniformity among
place names.6 Not every local place name is registered, however,
leaving significant interpretive gaps in deeds that refer to areas that
are locally known but happen to lie beneath the radar of federal
registration.7 This problem is only exacerbated when, either as a
result of inconsistent federal naming, or worse, misnamed places,
interpreting a property description results in different conveyances
depending on whether the local or federal definition is applied.8
Because federal place-name definitions are not binding on state
courts,9 triers of fact must resolve these definitional ambiguities by
simply weighing the evidence, forcing them to choose between what
is locally known and what is formally recognized.10 This added layer
of confusion and uncertainty in defining individuals’ property rights
seems counterintuitive in a system built upon the need for certainty
and predictability.11 This Note’s local solution brings clarity to an
5. See, for example, Apple Tree Hollow, located in Bath County, Virginia, and Old Still
Hollow, located in Lee County, Virginia; both are formally registered in the federal system.
Geographic Names Information System, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV., https://geonames.usgs.gov/
apex/f?p=138:1:551570168680 [https://perma.cc/PHJ8-M3QR] (type “hollow” into the “Feature
Name” search bar; then select “Virginia” from the “State” options; then select “Send Query”).
6. U.S. Board on Geographic Names: Home, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV., https://www.usgs.
gov/core-science-systems/ngp/board-on-geographic-names [https://perma.cc/7W9X-4SUA] (discussing the federal government’s concern over contradictions among place names and spellings, specifically for surveyors, map makers, military personnel, and others who “require[ ]
uniform ... nomenclature”).
7. See, e.g., Plum Creek Timberlands, L.P. v. Yellow Poplar Lumber Co., No.
1:13CV00062, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160930, at *15 (W.D. Va. Nov. 21, 2016) (holding a
contractual clause “convey[ing] ‘all ... tracts, pieces or parcels of land, or interests in land ...
on the watersheds of Levisa River and Dismal Creek and their tributaries in ... Buchanan
County, Virginia” to be ambiguous).
8. To counteract this problem, Arizona State University distinguishes between placename databases based on whether they list federal place names or state place names. See
Geographical Sciences, ARIZ. STATE UNIV., https://libguides.asu.edu/c.php?g=263829&p=176
2311 [https://perma.cc/BC3P-C9EE].
9. See U.S. Board on Geographic Names: Home, supra note 6 (explaining that the BGN’s
decisions are only “binding [on] all departments and agencies of the Federal Government”).
10. See Blacksburg Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Bell, 100 S.E. 806, 810 (Va. 1919) (“[T]he
question of the location of the land embraced in [a] deed [is] within the province of the jury.”).
11. See Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 687 (1979) (recognizing “the special
need for certainty and predictability where land titles are concerned”).
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otherwise jumbled problem. For if anyone can navigate the rugged,
ambiguous property descriptions in Appalachia, then there is no
better source of authority than the experts themselves: local
residents.12
This Note proceeds in four parts. Part I introduces the Appalachian region and the goals of federal standardization. Part II
discusses the idiosyncrasies of the dominant land demarcation
system in Appalachia, the metes and bounds system, and how it has
affected legal principles of property law and deed interpretation.
Using a recent case out of the Western District of Virginia, Plum
Creek Timberlands, L.P. v. Yellow Poplar Lumber Co.,13 Part II also
highlights the problem of vertical ambiguity.
Part III proposes a solution, seeking to find common ground by
balancing both the interests of local communities and the interests
of the property system as a whole. Rooting itself in the practical
challenges of applying metes and bounds to Appalachian property
descriptions as well as in the anthropological concept of “cultural
attachment,”14 Part III justifies the proposal as a fair and equitable
solution that provides clarity to a currently ambiguous system.
Lastly, Part IV reveals that a presumption in favor of local knowledge would have limited effects on alienability. Moreover, Part IV
explains why standardization scholars, such as Professors Thomas
Merrill and Henry Smith, have exaggerated their concerns over the
potential for heightened transaction costs because the presumption
argued for here does not create a new “form” of property but rather
works within the current system in a way that cabins the proposal’s
scope. Further, rather than undermine the goals of federal standardization, this proposal complements the policy of the BGN.

12. See GINNY BENGSTON & REBECCA L. AUSTIN, THE PROPOSED MOUNTAIN VALLEY
PIPELINE JEFFERSON NATIONAL FOREST SEGMENT CULTURAL ATTACHMENT REPORT 47 (Applied
Cultural Ecology, LLC ed., 2016) (noting that local residents [on the Virginia-West Virginia
border] often talked “about how they knew every inch of their land and that they held those
lands in a special kind of reverence”).
13. No. 1:13CV00062, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160930 (W.D. Va. Nov. 21, 2016).
14. JAMES A. KENT, JOHN RYAN, CAROLYN HUNKA & ROBERT SCHULTZ, CULTURAL
ATTACHMENT: ASSESSMENT OF IMPACTS TO LIVING CULTURE 1 (1996) (defining “cultural
attachment” as “the cumulative effect over time of a collection of traditions, attitudes,
practices, and stories that tie a person to the land, to physical place, and to kinship patterns”).
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I. BACKGROUND
This Note centers around Appalachia—both its culture and its
people.15 For generations, people have argued over exactly where
Appalachia really is,16 or even if it exists at all.17 For the purposes of
this Note, however, the where question will be answered using John
Alexander Williams’ 1996 definition, “Consensus Appalachia,” as
this definition is particularly helpful in “delineating a more
inclusive Appalachian Virginia.”18
While some define the region using the Appalachian Regional
Commission’s (ARC) definition of Appalachia, that definition, in
certain ways, is “the most flawed,” as “it is as much the product of
political horse-trading as it is of any intellectual rationale.”19 The
“Consensus” definition, on the other hand, takes a more holistic and
cultural approach, restoring seven of Virginia’s northwestern tier
counties—Augusta, Rockingham, Shenandoah, Page, Frederick,
Clarke, and Warren—as well as Roanoke County, to its definition
of Appalachia, despite the fact that the ARC excludes them on political and economic grounds.20 The result is an Appalachian Virginia
which includes every county west of the Blue Ridge, roughly following the Interstate 81 corridor.21 In addition to these Virginian
15. For guidance on the pronunciation of the word “Appalachia,” see Sharyn McCrumb,
Pronouncing Appalachia.mp4, YOUTUBE (Apr. 28, 2010), https://www.youtube.com/watch?
time_continue=141&v=eGCqWrsAZ_o [https://perma.cc/MNK6-SQR9] (“Appa-LAY-shuh is
the pronunciation of condescension, the pronunciation of the imperialists, the pronunciation
of people who do not want to be associated with the place, and Appa-LATCH-uh means that
you are on the side that we trust.”).
16. See Stewart Scales, Emily Satterwhite & Abigail August, Mapping Appalachia’s
Boundaries: Historiographic Overview and Digital Collection, 24 J. APPALACHIAN STUD. 89,
89 (2018) (quoting DAVID WHISNANT, MODERNIZING THE MOUNTAINEER: PEOPLE, POWER, AND
PLANNING IN APPALACHIA 134 (N.Y.: Burt Franklin 1980)) (“Appalachian boundaries have
been drawn so many times by so many different hands that it is futile to look for a correct definition of the region.”).
17. Nicholas F. Stump & Anne Marie Lofaso, De-Essentializing Appalachia: Transformative Socio-Legal Change Requires Unmasking Regional Myths, 120 W. VA. L. REV. 823,
823, 825-27 (2018) (describing the “Appalachian myth” as a willful creation for the benefit of
industrial interests in the region’s natural resources).
18. Scales et al., supra note 16, at 94, 96.
19. Id. at 96.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 94.

https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlronline/vol62/iss1/4

6

Spotswood: A Strange Land and a Peculiar Problem: Using Local Knowledge to R

2021]

A STRANGE LAND AND A PECULIAR PROBLEM

77

counties, the Consensus definition includes eastern Kentucky,
eastern Tennessee, western North Carolina, three counties in farnorthwest South Carolina, northern Georgia, northeastern Alabama, and essentially the entire state of West Virginia.22
The romanticization of Appalachia as a land forgotten in time can
largely be traced to Will Wallace Harney’s now-infamous article, “A
Strange Land and a Peculiar People,”23 published in an 1873 issue
of Lippincott’s Magazine of Popular Literature and Science.24 Today,
nearly 150 years later, the “quaint”25 image of the backward hillbilly
largely remains the stereotypical mascot of Appalachia.26 Portrayed
as “poor, lazy, isolated, violent, illiterate, and hard-drinking,”27
hillbillies have consistently been the unwanted step-child of
America.28 Mocked for so long, this Note seeks to restore the image
of the Appalachian hillbilly, not as the uneducated and dangerous
bootlegger, but as the property system’s most knowledgeable and
reliable expert in terms of resolving ambiguous property descriptions in Appalachia. Yet before one can appreciate the expertise of
local Appalachian residents, one must first understand the peculiarity of their geographic location.
A. A Strange Land
Standing in Roanoke, Virginia, one stands closer to two other
state capitals than that of Virginia—Charleston, West Virginia, and
Raleigh, North Carolina.29 Continuing further southwest, one gets
further and further from Richmond, until eventually, after roughly
22. Id.
23. Will Wallace Harney, A Strange Land and a Peculiar People, 12 LIPPINCOTT’S MAG.
POPULAR LITERATURE & SCI. 429, 429-31 (1873) (describing the juxtaposition between the
natural beauty of Appalachia and its “backward” inhabitants).
24. Stump & Lofaso, supra note 17, at 825 & n.7.
25. Harney, supra note 23, at 430-31.
26. David C. Hsiung, Stereotypes, in HIGH MOUNTAINS RISING: APPALACHIA IN TIME AND
PLACE 101, 107 (Richard Straw & H. Tyler Blethen eds., 2004).
27. Id. at 101.
28. See Stump & Lofaso, supra note 17, at 823 (“Appalachia has been essentialized as an
‘other America’ that is not just different from but also lesser than the broader United States.”).
29. Southwest Virginia Is Further Away from Richmond than You Think, ROANOKE TIMES
(Jun. 24, 2018), https://www.roanoke.com/opinion/editorials/editorial-southwest-virginia-isfurther-away-from-richmond-than-you/article_63e3adc5-8294-520e-8351-4a44ca99e3c5.html
[https://perma.cc/YE73-A2DH].
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a two-hour drive southwest from Roanoke, one stands closer to seven
other state capitals than Richmond.30 “But, wait, there’s more!”31
Keep going west and you reach the counties of Lee, Scott, and
Wise—parts of each being closer to eight other state capitals than
Richmond—with the grand finale in Ewing, Virginia, a town closer
to nine other state capitals than its own.32 This geographic oddity
makes Southwest Virginia unique, as no other place in the country
is closer to eight (much less nine) other state capitals than its own.33
This begs the question: “If something happens in Southwest Virginia, does it make a sound in Richmond?”34
Although the issues of place-name standardization and cultural
attachment presented in this Note spans the entirety of the
Appalachian region,35 with potentially global impacts on deed
interpretation,36 such applications are outside the scope of this Note.
This Note will focus almost entirely on Virginia law and, as a result,
Southwest Virginia. Thus, it is this geographic separation from
political representation that provides further support for the
proposition that local knowledge will often far exceed that of distant
government agencies or politicians.
However, more than just the geographic location of Appalachia is
unique; the physically rugged terrain can make traversing the
landscape a trap for the unwary. With long ridges, deep gorges,
narrow creek valleys, sharp cliffs, and an overall scarcity of flat
land, travelling through the Appalachians can often be hazardous.37
30. Id. (noting that Bristol, Virginia, is closer to seven other state capitals than Richmond).
31. Id.
32. Id. (noting that the capitals of Kentucky, West Virginia, Tennessee, Georgia, South
Carolina, Ohio, Indiana, North Carolina, and Alabama are closer to Ewing, Virginia, than
Richmond).
33. Id.
34. Id. (discussing the impact of geographic separation on the political process in
Southwest Virginia).
35. See JAMES A. KENT & KEVIN PREISTER, THE SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF CULTURAL
ATTACHMENT AS A SOCIAL PHENOMENON AND THE BASIS FOR AN “ALL LANDS” APPROACH IN
NEPA DECISION-MAKING 18 (2015) (noting that “there is an expectation that a high level of
Cultural Attachment” will exist in Appalachian counties).
36. Id. at 6-10 (noting the presence of cultural attachment in native Hawaiian populations
and indigenous Australian populations).
37. Harney provides a romanticized, anecdotal account of these topographical features.
See Harney, supra note 23, at 429-31.
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Perhaps a result of its unique geographic location, its unique
topography, or both, the lands of Appalachia hold special meaning
in the hearts of the people that call them home.38 In what Professor
Barbara Allen calls a “generational memory,” local residents often
attach a patchwork of cultural importance onto the land around
them, creating “an emotionally powerful sense of place that almost
defies articulation.”39
B. Federal Standardization
Federal standardization of place names in the United States
began in the late nineteenth century.40 After the American Civil
War, “[i]nconsistencies and contradictions among ... [place] names,
their spellings, and applications became a serious problem for
mapmakers and scientists who required uniform, non-conflicting
geographic nomenclature” for communication.41
In response to these concerns, and with the belief that the answer
was broad federal regulation, President Benjamin Harrison signed
Executive Order 28 on September 4, 1890, establishing the United
States Board on Geographic Names (BGN).42 “The BGN was given
authority to resolve all unsettled questions concerning geographic
names,” and its decisions “were accepted as binding by all departments and agencies of the Federal Government.”43
In 1947, Congress officially codified the BGN to “provide for
uniformity in geographic nomenclature and orthography throughout
the Federal Government.”44 The BGN is therefore responsible for
“solving name discrepancies, approving new names, validating and
38. See KENT ET AL., supra note 14, at 10 (noting that the Appalachian attachment to land
is similar to descriptions of traditional cultural and spiritual relationships used in describing
Native Americans’ attachment to land).
39. See Barbara Allen, The Genealogical Landscape and the Southern Sense of Place, in
SENSE OF PLACE: AMERICAN REGIONAL CULTURES 152, 161 (Barbara Allen & Thomas J.
Schlereth eds., 1990).
40. U.S. BD. OF GEOGRAPHIC NAMES DOMESTIC NAMES COMM., PRINCIPLES, POLICIES, AND
PROCEDURES: DOMESTIC GEOGRAPHIC NAMES, 1, 2 (2016) [hereinafter DNC], https://geonames.
usgs.gov/docs/pubs/DNC_PPP_DEC_2016_V.2.0.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q64J-UT37].
41. Id. at 1.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Act of July 25, 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-242, 61 Stat. 456 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 364364f).
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recording existing names, and promulgating all official names” for
the Federal Government.45 Since 1947, the Domestic Names
Committee (DNC), a subdivision of the BGN, has been “responsible
for standardizing the names of places, features, and areas within
the [United] States.”46 The DNC consists of representatives from the
Departments of the Interior, Commerce, Agriculture, Defense, and
Homeland Security, as well as the United States Postal Service,
Government Publishing Office, and Library of Congress.47
The DNC rules on hundreds of naming decisions per year,
responding to proposals from federal agencies, state and local
governments, and the public.48 The DNC relies on a multitude of
factors in its decision-making process, including local use and
acceptance,49 verbal usage, established usage, historical usage, legal
usage, legislated usage, and written usage.50 Advocates of a new
name or changed name must then support their claim with evidence
typically consisting of government records, maps, letters, and other
documentation of local support.51 Importantly, all BGN decisions are
still binding only on the departments and agencies of the federal
government.52 Thus, any lingering disputes over place names and
their locations (or existence) remain open to state and local
interpretation.
II. PROPERTY DESCRIPTIONS AND THE PROBLEM OF
“VERTICAL AMBIGUITY”
This Part addresses the underlying legal principles of contract
and property law that govern the interpretation of ambiguities in
45. DNC, supra note 40, at 2.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Jeremy Berlin, Who Decides What Names Go on a Map?, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Sept.
18, 2015), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/news/2015/09/150918-us-board-geographicalnames-125th-anniversary-national-geographic-maps-place-names/#close [https://perma.cc/
98NP-FE7L]. Once the BGN decides the standard term that will be used for a place name, the
BGN requires a “compelling reason” before it will change a name. DNC, supra note 40, at 11.
49. DNC, supra note 40, at 2 (noting that a “primary principle” of the BGN is “formal
recognition of present-day local usage”).
50. Id. at 3-4.
51. Id. at 28.
52. Id. at 1.
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property descriptions. This Part demonstrates how, in instances of
“vertical ambiguity,” discrepancies between local definitions and
federal, standardized definitions create a tension that exacerbates
the definitional issue already inherent in mountain property.
A. Property Descriptions
The ability to define the property conveyed is perhaps the most
important part of a property transaction.53 In a property system
built around the need for reliability and certainty, accurate property
descriptions are vital to the system’s proper functioning.54 This Note
focuses on ambiguities that arise in describing property, for example, ambiguities with respect to metes and bounds property
descriptions55 and ambiguities inherent in “catch-all” or “Mother
Hubbard” clauses.56 Because the latter are often seen as somewhat of a remedy for the former, it is necessary to understand how
the metes and bounds system operates.
1. Metes and Bounds
The metes and bounds system has historically been the dominant
method for demarcating boundaries in the eastern United States,
including Appalachia.57 Metes and bounds is a system of demarcation that uses local knowledge and impermanent markers to define
53. See Donald J. Kochan, Deeds and the Determinacy Norm: Insights from Brandt and
Other Cases on an Undesignated, Yet Ever-Present, Interpretive Method, 43 FLA. STATE U. L.
REV. 793, 795 (2016) (arguing that deeds must have a fixed, identifiable meaning at the time
of conveyance).
54. Id. at 823-24 (discussing the need for a “high level of certainty” in property transactions).
55. Maureen E. Brady, The Forgotten History of Metes and Bounds, 128 YALE L.J. 872, 875
(2019) (describing how property descriptions using the metes and bounds system commonly
demarcate property using local monuments or “reference to neighbors’ lands and other nearby
features”).
56. Mother Hubbard Clause Law and Legal Definition, USLEGAL, https://definitions.
uslegal.com/m/mother-hubbard-clause/ [https://perma.cc/9PZQ-QNYK] (defining a “Mother
Hubbard” clause as a deed provision that describes property in general language in an
attempt to sweep parcels not specifically described into its grasp).
57. See Brady, supra note 55, at 875; Libecap & Lueck, supra note 3, at 427, 432; see also
Surveying in Virginia, VIRGINIAPLACES.ORG, http://www.virginiaplaces.org/boundaries/sur
veying.html [https://perma.cc/GV5W-BXUD] (explaining the mechanics of colonial surveying
in Virginia).
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the boundaries of a particular parcel of land.58 Such descriptions
“define[ ] parcels independently and idiosyncratically using nonstandard, impermanent natural features (rocks, streams, trees);
structures (walls, monuments); and adjacent properties (‘southwest
corner of Benjamin Beasley’s survey’).”59 Due to these highly
customized reference points, the metes and bounds system can be
used to map parcels as simple as a rectangle and as complex as the
mind desires.60
At its core, the metes and bounds system is decentralized, serving
as a direct contrast to the more precise, standardized rectangular
demarcation system.61 The rectangular system adopts a uniform,
inflexible, grid-like structure that uses rectangular quadrants to
map out parcels of equal shape and size.62 The metes and bounds
system, however, is more popular in the Appalachians because it is
customizable and adaptable in rough terrain, using natural
boundaries rather than artificial grids.63 The result, especially in
mountainous areas, is a hodgepodge of parcels that are uniform in
neither shape nor size.64
Due to their highly irregular shapes, imperfect measurements,
and often transient markers, metes and bounds descriptions
inherently produce ambiguities in property descriptions.65 Over
time, trees fall, neighbors move, and the plots once mapped by
metes and bounds property descriptions become impossible to recreate with any sort of certainty, if at all.66 As a result, a litany of
58. See Brady, supra note 55, at 872.
59. Libecap & Lueck, supra note 3, at 427; see, e.g., Asberry v. Mitchell, 93 S.E. 638, 639
(Va. 1917) (interpreting a deed describing property as “[o]ne hundred acres of land, bounded
by Sarah M. Ratliff on the north and by E. R. Mitchell on the south, off the west end of the
farm of H. C. Asberry”).
60. Brady, supra note 55, at 875.
61. Libecap & Lueck, supra note 3, at 427-28.
62. See id. at 429-32 (explaining how properties were described with a simple grid
number).
63. See id. at 426-27 (providing a sample metes and bound description reading as follows:
“Beginning at a white oak in the fork of four mile run called the long branch & running [North
88 degrees West] three hundred thirty eight poles to the Line of Capt. Pearson, then with the
line of Pearson ... One hundred Eighty-eight poles to a Gum.”).
64. Id. at 427.
65. See id. at 451 (explaining that metes and bounds descriptions often resulted in land
disputes and general confusion over the limits of property ownership).
66. Brady, supra note 55, at 951.
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potential legal claims await the unwary property owner—competing
claims for overlapping borders, uncertainty over total acreage,
mistakes found in surveys, gaps in ownership—each leaving land
titles open to seemingly endless legal challenge.67
These inherent ambiguities and variances in metes and bounds
descriptions only become more frequent as terrain becomes more
rugged.68 After all, a land demarcation system that used poles and
chains to measure distance was bound to become less accurate in
the rugged, up-and-down mountainous terrain of the Appalachians
than on flat land.69
2. Legal Requirements and “Mother Hubbard” Clauses
Parties transfer ownership of real property through transactions
called “conveyances.”70 Using a deed, the parties to a transaction
must identify the buyer (grantee), the seller (grantor), any consideration given for the property, and a legal description of the property
to be transferred.71 To complete the transaction, the signed and
notarized deed must then be recorded at the appropriate landrecordation office, commonly the locality’s registrar’s office.72
The ability to define the property conveyed is perhaps the most
important part of this transaction, as the parties involved must be
able to know “who has what and when.”73 In order to be valid, a
property description must “contain[ ] sufficient terms to designate
67. Libecap & Lueck, supra note 3, at 451.
68. Id. at 441.
69. See id. at 436, 441 (noting that as the “ruggedness” of a landscape increases, the
prevalence of irregular plot shapes and demarcation variances also increases).
70. Bridget Molitor, Transferring Property, FINDLAW, https://realestate.findlaw.com/
selling-your-home/transferring-property.html [https://perma.cc/WT6F-EWCA].
71. Id.
72. Id. This is obviously an over-simplified summary of how property conveyances operate.
As this Note will only focus on the issue of defining and describing property in Appalachia,
issues concerning the intricacies of state recording statutes are outside the scope of this Note.
73. Kochan, supra note 53, at 795. Issues with property descriptions also raise larger
questions involving title insurance and marketability of title. Amanda Farrell, Why the Legal
Description Is So Important in Land Surveys, PROPLOGIX, (Aug. 9, 2018), https://www.prop
logix.com/blog/why-the-legal-description-is-so-important-in-land-surveys [https://perma.cc/
BJ7Y-8QUK]. Title companies will often have their own property description requirements
before they will issue a title insurance policy to a buyer and may even require a new survey.
Id. Since these are not legal requirements, such issues and requirements are outside the scope
of this Note.
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the land in question.”74 Surprisingly, metes and bounds descriptions
are not required to convey property; so long as there is a way to
reasonably ascertain the intended boundaries, a court will not
invalidate a conveyance for vagueness.75
To offset what are frequently unreliable metes and bounds
boundary descriptions, practitioners commonly include “catch-all”
phrases, or “Mother Hubbard” clauses, which act as somewhat of an
“insurance policy.”76 While such clauses are, by definition, vague,
their use serves the important purpose of “catching” the property
intended but perhaps not actually captured by a metes and bounds
description.77 Thus, even though such phrases “unequivocally
expand[ ] the conveyance to property beyond that specifically
described in the deed,” they do not void a deed for uncertainty.78
Even clauses including conveyances of “all the land of the grantor
in a certain county,”79 or all the lands within a certain watershed,
are enough to effectuate a transfer, so long as one may reasonably
ascertain the property the parties intended to convey.80
B. Defining Ambiguity
Simply put, a deed is a contract for land. Thus, state contract law
governs the interpretation and construction of deeds.81 In Virginia,
where the language of a deed is clear and unambiguous, a court is
required to construe the terms according to their “plain meaning.”82
74. Blacksburg Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Bell, 100 S.E. 806, 811 (Va. 1919).
75. See Amos v. Coffey, 320 S.E.2d 335, 338 (Va. 1984) (giving effect to a deed conveying
lands not described in the deed).
76. Mark Burghardt, The Mother Hubbard Clause, OIL & GAS REP., (Oct. 20, 2015), https://
www.theoilandgasreport.com/2015/10/20/the-mother-hubbard-clause/ [https://perma.cc/ LG7N27KV].
77. Id.
78. Vicars v. First Va. Bank-Mountain Empire, 458 S.E.2d 293, 295 (Va. 1995).
79. Carrington v. Goddin, 54 Va. 587, 609 (1857); see Amos, 320 S.E.2d at 336, 338 (finding
a deed that conveyed “all of those certain tracts or parcels of land ... in or near the Town of
Gretna” was not void for uncertainty).
80. See Plum Creek Timberlands, L.P. v. Yellow Poplar Lumber Co., No. 1:13CV00062,
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160930, at *15 (W.D. Va. Nov. 21, 2016) (interpreting a deed conveying
all of the property owned by the grantor “on the watersheds of Levisa River and Dismal Creek
and their tributaries”).
81. Contract, CORNELL L. SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/
contract [https://perma.cc/EXF5-RWDC].
82. Amos, 320 S.E.2d at 337 (citing Berry v. Klinger, 300 S.E.2d 792, 796 (Va. 1983)).
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Thus, a Virginia court may not look outside the four corners of a
deed to determine whether language is clear and unambiguous.83
The “guiding light” for courts in this process “is the intention of the
parties as expressed by them in the words they have used,”84 and no
rule of construction may be used to defeat that intention.85
Another well-established principle of deed interpretation in
Virginia is the parol evidence rule.86 The parol evidence rule
generally states that prior or contemporaneous written or oral
agreements can never be introduced as evidence “to vary, contradict,
add to, or explain” an unambiguous and final written agreement.87
By governing the extent to which parties can introduce evidence of
a prior or contemporaneous agreement (called parol or extrinsic
evidence), this rule acts a gatekeeper for the jury, controlling what
jurors are allowed to consider in making their interpretive determinations.88
The question of whether a deed is ambiguous is a question of law
to be determined by a court.89 Mere disagreement is not enough to
create an ambiguity.90 Rather, in order to be ambiguous, the
language of a deed must be “obscure and doubtful,” either referring
to two or more things at the same time or being capable of more
than one reasonable understanding.91
It is only after a court deems a deed ambiguous on its face that it
may then admit extrinsic evidence to ascertain the intent of the
parties.92 Once the question becomes one of subject matter—that is,
83. CNX Gas Co. v. Rasnake, 752 S.E.2d 865, 867 (Va. 2014).
84. Amos, 320 S.E.2d at 337 (quoting Magann Corp. v. Elec. Works, 123 S.E.2d 377, 381
(Va. 1962)).
85. CNX Gas Co., 752 S.E.2d at 867.
86. Amos, 320 S.E.2d at 337.
87. Id. (quoting Godwin v. Kerns, 17 S.E.2d 410, 412 (1941)).
88. See Parol Evidence Rule, CORNELL L. SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.
edu/wex/parol_evidence_rule [https://perma.cc/YXR6-2T37].
89. Langman v. Alumni Ass’n of the Univ. of Va., 442 S.E.2d 669, 674 (Va. 1994).
90. Wilson v. Holyfield, 313 S.E.2d 396, 398 (Va. 1984) (“Contracts are not rendered
ambiguous merely because the parties disagree as to the meaning of the language employed
by them in expressing their agreement.”).
91. CNX Gas Co. v. Rasnake, 752 S.E.2d 865, 867 (Va. 2014) (first citing Harris v. Scott,
18 S.E.2d 305, 307 (Va. 1942); and then citing Schultz v. Carter, 151 S.E. 130, 131 (Va. 1930)).
92. Robinson-Huntley v. George Washington Carver Mut. Homes Ass’n, 756 S.E.2d 415,
418 (Va. 2014) (citing Eure v. Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp., 561 S.E.2d 663, 667-68
(Va. 2002)).
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a dispute over location rather than construction—the question falls
within the province of the jury and is taken out of the court’s
hands.93
C. The Problem of “Vertical Ambiguity”
Under current law, there is no distinction between types of
ambiguity—once a description is determined to be ambiguous, all
descriptions are given to the jury to resolve.94 However, not all
ambiguities are created equal. Some ambiguities, what this Note
refers to as “vertical ambiguities,” raise fundamental issues of
federalism and cultural attachment—directly challenging who gets
to define property.95
The focus here is on the source of the ambiguity. If the ambiguity
is a result of a variance between a local and standardized definition,
then that ambiguity is vertical because the disagreement is over
who gets to define property—local residents or federal agencies. In
contrast, if an ambiguity is the result of a variance in the parties’
understanding of rights contained in property, then that ambiguity
would be horizontal because the disagreement is over the type of
property transferred.
The case of Plum Creek Timberlands, L.P. v. Yellow Poplar
Lumber Co. is illustrative.96 In Plum Creek, the plaintiff, Plum
Creek Timberlands, sued Yellow Poplar Lumber Company seeking
a declaration that it was the lawful owner of certain natural gas
interests located in Buchanan County because a 1930 deed purporting to convey such property was null and void.97 The property in
question was once owned by the defendant Yellow Poplar, an entity
that was in the midst of bankruptcy proceedings in South Carolina
at the time the 1930 deed was executed.98
93. See Blacksburg Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Bell, 100 S.E. 806, 810 (Va. 1919) (“[T]he
question of the location of the land embraced in [a] deed [is] within the province of the jury.”).
94. See id.
95. See Nestor M. Davidson, Standardization and Pluralism in Property Law, 61 VAND.
L. REV. 1597, 1617 (2008) (acknowledging the federalism issue present in modern American
property law discrepancies).
96. No. 1:13CV00062, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160930 (W.D. Va. Nov. 21, 2016).
97. Plum Creek Timberlands, L.P. v. Yellow Poplar Lumber Co., No. 1:13CV00062, 2014
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43421, at *1-2 (W.D. Va. Mar. 31, 2014).
98. Id. at *2.
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On September 13, 1929, the United States District Court for the
Western District of South Carolina, presiding over the bankruptcy
proceedings, directed the trustee of Yellow Poplar to convey to W.M.
Ritter Lumber Company certain tracts of land located in Buchanan
County (the Ritter Deed).99 “The court’s decree described the four
tracts of land to be conveyed, but also included a catch-all provision,” which stated:
It being the intention to embrace herein and convey hereby all
of the tracts, pieces or parcels of land, or interests in land owned
by Yellow Poplar Lumber Company on the watersheds of Levisa
River and Dismal Creek and their tributaries in said Buchanan
County, Virginia, whether hereinabove described, or referred to,
or not.100

At the time of the Ritter Deed, Yellow Poplar also owned two
tracts of land, described as Tracts 10 and 11.101 On October 16, 1930,
a second decree by the Western District of South Carolina deeded
Tract 10 to C.G. Jackson.102 Plum Creek argued that this second
deed, the Jackson deed, was invalid on the grounds that Tract 10
was located “on the watershed of the Levisa River,” and thus had
already been conveyed by the catch-all language of the Ritter
Deed.103
The catch-all language of the Ritter Deed was critical, purporting
to convey all of the tracts of land owned by Yellow Poplar “on the
watersheds of Levisa River and Dismal Creek and their tributaries
in said Buchanan County, Virginia.”104 “This language could
reasonably be interpreted” in one of two ways: (1) the language
could have conveyed “all of Yellow Poplar’s land located in Buchanan County, which land was also located on a watershed or
tributary of Levisa River or Dismal Creek”—as the plaintiffs
argued; or (2) the language could have conveyed “all of Yellow
Poplar’s land that was located on a watershed or tributary of Levisa
99. Id. at *3.
100. Id. at *3-4.
101. Id. at *4.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Plum Creek Timberlands, L.P. v. Yellow Poplar Lumber Co., No. 1:13CV00062, 2016
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160930, at *15 (W.D. Va. Nov. 21, 2016).
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River or Dismal Creek, which watershed or tributary was located in
Buchanan County”—as the defendants argued.105 Since this
language could have reasonably been interpreted in more than one
way, the court found the catch-all provision in the Ritter Deed to be
ambiguous and permitted the parties to submit extrinsic evidence
to show which parcels the parties to the Ritter Deed originally
intended to convey.106
Plum Creek hired several experts to testify that the Russell Fork
was a tributary of the Levisa Fork and that Tracts 10 and 11 were
thus located within the watershed of the Levisa Fork and subject to
the 1929 conveyance.107 For example, Plum Creek hired a hydrologist, a geologist, and a surveyor.108 Each witness based their opinion
almost entirely on federal, standardized definitions of the Big Sandy
and Levisa Fork River watersheds.109 Relying heavily on reports
from the United States Engineer’s office and maps from the United
States Geological Survey, Plum Creek argued that Tract 10 fell
within the watershed of the Levisa Fork, and thus were conveyed in
the Ritter Deed.110
In contrast, Yellow Poplar hired its own experts, including a
geologist/hydrologist and a surveyor,111 as well as a natural
historian to testify that the Russell Fork had never been locally
understood as being in the Levisa Fork watershed.112 Critically, a
natural historian, a person with “knowledge of the naming conventions historically prevalent in the area,”113 sought to testify that, in
his opinion, “it [was] unlikely” that a citizen in Southwest Virginia
at that time would have “considered the Russell Fork watershed and
the Levisa River/Dismal Creek watershed to be the same watershed.”114
This is a direct contradiction. On the one hand, Plum Creek
argued that the federal definition should control, saying that
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at *15-16.
Id.
Id. at *23-26.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id. at *6.
Id. at *17-20.
Id. at *20.
Id. at *17.
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because Tract 10 was on the Russell Fork and the Russell Fork was
federally defined as being within the Levisa Fork watershed, Tract
10 was conveyed by the catch-all provision.115 Yet on the other hand,
Yellow Poplar argued that the local understanding should control,
saying that, regardless of how the federal government defined the
Levisa Fork watershed, the local residents of Buchanan County get
to decide which land constitutes the Levisa Fork watershed.116
Therefore, since Buchanan County residents would have never
considered the Russell Fork watershed and the Levisa Fork
watershed to be the same watershed, Tract 10 was not included in
the 1929 Ritter Deed.117
This problem, evinced by Plum Creek, is one of local knowledge
versus standardization. The issue can be boiled down to essentially
one question: Who gets to decide what the Levisa Fork watershed
encompasses? This question strikes at the heart of property law, as
it affects the core of real estate transfers—defining the property to
be conveyed—and presents a central debate over the legitimacy of
local place-naming systems that define property in relation to
cultural importance.
III. HILLBILLY EXPERTS: WHY LOCAL RESIDENTS
DESERVE DEFERENCE
Appalachian hillbillies, by virtue of living in the area, have objectively superior knowledge of the land around them. It is their
attachment to place, however, that distinguishes them as the
property system’s most reliable experts for resolving ambiguous
property descriptions in Appalachia. The Appalachian attachment
to land is a distinct “hallmark of their regional identity.”118 Significantly, this cultural phenomenon is something that commonly
expresses itself in property descriptions.119 Like a collection of
private maps, deeds often give third parties a sense of how people
115. See id. at *23-26.
116. See id. at *17-20.
117. Id. at *17-18.
118. Allen, supra note 39, at 152.
119. See, e.g., Asberry v. Mitchell, 93 S.E. 638, 639 (Va. 1917) (involving a deed of land “on
the north side of Clinch Mountain, in Little Valley,” which conveyed property based on the
locations of the neighbors’ lands, which “were well known to the parties”).

Published by William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository, 2021

19

William & Mary Law Review Online, Vol. 62 [2021], Art. 4

90

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW ONLINE

[Vol. 62:071

understand the land around them.120 More than just a legal
document, a deed tells a generational story.121 Thus, in instances of
vertical ambiguity, they system’s greatest and most dependable
reference points are the stories themselves, bound by the annals of
local history and preserved by the people who call the land home.
A. Cultural Attachment
Cultural attachment is “the cumulative effect over time of a
collection of traditions, attitudes, practices, and stories that tie a
person to the land.”122 This social phenomenon has three essential
elements: (1) land, (2) physical place, and (3) kinship patterns—with
each element being intricately linked to the other in a dynamic
social-ecosystem.123 While this phenomenon is not specific to
Appalachians,124 the level of cultural attachment commonly found
in Appalachia is particularly unique.125
Critically, cultural attachment is nontransferable.126 By definition, cultural attachment is linked to a specific piece of land, a
distinct physical place, and a certain kinship pattern.127 Thus, by
definition, “its loss cannot be mitigated through monetization, or by
the receipt of comparable land”—as there can be only one place.128
1. Land as Family
The importance of land in Appalachia signifies that local residents are uniquely qualified to resolve property description
ambiguities because they are both intensely knowledgeable and
120. STEVEN STOLL, RAMP HOLLOW: THE ORDEAL OF APPALACHIA 161 (2017).
121. See id. (“A deed might seem like an impersonal legal instrument, but local deeds [tell]
stories and trace[ ] the transfer of land between and within families.”).
122. KENT ET AL., supra note 14, at 1.
123. Id. at 4-5.
124. KENT & PREISTER, supra note 35, at 6-10, 37 (noting the existence of cultural
attachment in native Hawaiian, indigenous Australian, and Native American populations).
125. BENGSTON & AUSTIN, supra note 12, at 47 (“[T]he people who reside in the Peters
Mountain area have a cultural attachment to the [Jefferson National Forest] that is different
from other areas here in the United States.”).
126. KENT ET AL., supra note 14, at 1.
127. Id.
128. KENT & PREISTER, supra note 35, at 4.
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especially invested in ensuring that conveyances protect family
lands. An Appalachian’s land is fundamental to her individual
identity.129 Throughout Appalachian communities, land has a
“sacred quality”—not uncommon to that of the Native American
attachment to land—that sees land not as a commodity but as part
of one’s own family.130 Rather than viewing land as an economic
investment, Appalachians often talk about land in noneconomic
“terms of self-sufficiency ... and stewardship.”131 In this context,
production on land is both prospective (preserving the land for the
next generation) and retrospective (maintaining and reassembling
the original land holdings of ancestors).132 Here, the land becomes
a mixture of both time and space, tying the past and present
together in a culturally significant and singular place.
By commingling geographic place with genealogical ancestry, the
intrinsic value of land outweighs its objective economic value.133 For
example, between 1875 and 1895, members of a prominent West
Virginia family, the Belchers, made at least one hundred land
transfers, approximately seventy-five involving individuals named
Belcher.134 And while nearly every transfer was written down or
recorded, very few made any mention of money.135 Stories like the
Belchers’ exist throughout the hills of Appalachia, highlighting the
long custom of a noneconomic property system in Appalachia that
recognizes the innate cultural importance of land.136

129. See Davidson, supra note 95, at 1620-21 (noting that property is fundamental to
individual identity and self-actualization).
130. KENT ET AL., supra note 14, at 4, 10 (noting that the Appalachian attachment to land
is similar to descriptions of traditional cultural and spiritual relationships used in describing
Native Americans’ attachment to land).
131. Id. at 4. (noting comments from Appalachians such as the following: “[t]his land isn’t
mine, I am just taking care of it for the next generation”).
132. Id. at 4-5.
133. See id. at 5 (quoting a local resident saying “people offer us money for our land but we
don’t sell it”).
134. STOLL, supra note 120, at 161.
135. Id. at 162.
136. See KENT ET AL., supra note 14, at 7 (“A person who is culturally attached has a
relationship to land, which is primarily based in non-economic values.”).
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2. Attachment to Place
The Appalachian sense of place, the “intimate knowledge of
[one’s] landscape [and] what happens in [one’s] landscape,” is one of
the most prominent elements of cultural attachment and further
evidence of local residents’ objectively superior knowledge of
property in Appalachia.137 Grounded in both individual and
generational memories, the intrinsic relationship between local
residents and the land they live on is perhaps most apparent in
towns and communities throughout Appalachia.138 To many
Appalachians, “place” is not just a plot of ground defined by legal
title but also one that is shaped by human occupancy.139 Place
names carry with them stories and values that attach the people to
their home.140 As James Kent and Kevin Preister noted in a 2015
study of Peters Mountain:“[I]t is impossible to separate the
communities who live between and among the [Jefferson] National
Forest lands from the landscape that surrounds them.”141
For example, culturally attached Appalachians will commonly
identify local properties through the use of family names, such as
“so-and-so’s house” or “so-and-so’s place,” evincing their intimate
association of people with the land around them.142 “[T]his knowledge is irreplaceable,”143 as the land itself takes on a “living interactive quality” that cannot be replicated anywhere else.144 The result
137. See id. at 4-5.
138. See KENT & PREISTER, supra note 35, at 18 (noting a high expectation that cultural
attachment will exist in Appalachia).
139. See Allen, supra note 39, at 158 (explaining that “place” is a loaded term in a
community’s vocabulary that carries a special meaning beyond its usual sense of locality and
implies a relationship between the specific piece of land and its owner).
140. KENT ET AL., supra note 14, at 5 (noting Appalachian commentary such as the
following: “[o]ur people are attached to the valleys and mountains all around us”); see Charles
Hillinger, Time and Custom Stand Still in the Hills and Hollers of West Virginia, L.A. TIMES
(Feb. 10, 1985, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1985-02-10-vw-3776story.html [https://perma.cc/8TP6-DXB5] (recalling two sisters in Odd, West Virginia, who
lived on “Johnny Sneed Mountain,” a mountain named for “their great-great-great-grandfather, who settled in Odd in the late 1700s”).
141. KENT & PREISTER, supra note 35, at 1.
142. Allen, supra note 39, at 158, 160 (“[L]ike individuals, [homeplaces] are [a] part of the
social fabric of the community.”).
143. KENT & PREISTER, supra note 35, at 18.
144. KENT ET AL., supra note 14, at 5 (noting that cultural attachment is commonly the
result of generations living in the same area over many years).
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is a patchwork of cultural importance that sprawls the hollers and
hills of Appalachia in a way that “almost defies articulation.”145
3. Kinship Patterns and the “Genealogical Landscape”
By associating people and families with distinct geographic
places, Appalachians have knowledge of the distinct “genealogical
landscapes” around them, “placing people within [certain] social and
geographical frame[works].”146 Using the household as a basic unit,
residents are able to use kinship patterns to foster a system of social
capital that furthers mutual cooperation, trust, and community.147
This complex relationship between the people, their ancestors,
and their land is a result of generations of family members living in
one area, a concept that has “characterized mountain living for the
last two hundred years.”148 More often than not, names and places
are interchangeable in mountain towns—allowing local residents to
“read” a landscape in both a physical and genealogical sense.149 In
fact, in many cases, where one lives can be “just as [important] in
establishing [one’s] identity as who [one’s] relatives are.”150 Thus, an
Appalachian is able to draw more than just an address or a property
description from land—she can draw from it a complex network of
relationships to better interpret place names and intentions of the
parties to a land transaction.
B. Using Local Knowledge to Resolve Place-Name Ambiguity
Property is inherently cultural, embedded with “layers of meaning and purpose.”151 As evinced by the concept of cultural attachment, an Appalachian’s land is more than just lines on a map; land
145. Allen, supra note 39, at 161.
146. Id. at 152.
147. KENT ET AL., supra note 14, at 5; see Chris Holtkamp & Russell Weaver, Place Identity
and Social Capital in an Appalachian Town, 25 J. APPALACHIAN STUD. 49, 50 (2019) (defining
social capital as “a place-based asset predicated on relationships between community
members and expressed through norms of behavior including trust, reciprocity, and
willingness to contribute to the public good”).
148. See KENT ET AL., supra note 14, at 8.
149. Allen, supra note 39, at 160.
150. Id. at 158 (emphasis added).
151. Davidson, supra note 95, at 1638.
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represents an entire web of social relationships.152 It is this deeplyrooted sense of cultural attachment that is perhaps the strongest
justification for the presumption for which this Note argues, for if
anyone knows the rugged terrain of the Appalachian Mountains, it
is the Appalachian hillbilly.153
1. Revisiting the Current State of Systemic Ambiguity
The current property system, although rooted in a desire for
certainty,154 is riddled with ambiguity.155 First, metes and bounds
property descriptions, with their use of impermanent reference
points and highly irregular shapes, inherently introduce uncertainty.156 Thus, plots once mapped by metes and bounds property
descriptions become nearly impossible to re-create with any sort of
certainty as time passes.157 Moreover, as terrain becomes more
rugged—as it so often tends to do in the Appalachians—these
inherent ambiguities and variances only become more frequent.158
Drop even the most experienced surveyors into the seemingly neverending, up-and-down, ridge-and-valley, undulating waves of
Appalachia, and disorientation becomes unavoidable.
Second, in addition to the physical difficulty of defining and
demarcating the land itself, the legal standard for property
descriptions merely requires “sufficient terms.”159 In fact, metes and
152. See KENT ET AL., supra note 14, at 4; see also Melinda Bollar Wagner, Space and Place,
Land and Legacy, in CULTURE, ENVIRONMENT, AND CONSERVATION IN THE APPALACHIAN
SOUTH 121, 123-24 (Benita J. Howell ed., 2002) (citing Lin Usack, Cultural Attachment to
Land Study 5, 8 (1994) (paper for Anthropology 411: Appalachian Cultures, Radford
University) (on file with author)) (“When land has been owned by a family for so many
generations, it ceases to be simply property: it moves from commodity to family member.”).
153. See BENGSTON & AUSTIN, supra note 12, at 47 (noting that local residents of Peters
Mountain often talked “about how they knew every inch of their land and that they held those
lands in a special kind of reverence”).
154. See Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 687 (1979) (recognizing a “special
need for certainty and predictability where land titles are concerned”).
155. See supra Part II.A.
156. See Libecap & Lueck, supra note 3, at 451.
157. Brady, supra note 55, at 951.
158. See Libecap & Lueck, supra note 3, at 436, 441 (noting that as the “ruggedness” of a
landscape increases, the prevalence of irregular plot shapes and demarcation variances also
increases).
159. Blacksburg Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Bell, 100 S.E. 806, 811 (Va. 1919) (“A description
‘which contains sufficient terms to designate the land in question with such certainty that the

https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlronline/vol62/iss1/4

24

Spotswood: A Strange Land and a Peculiar Problem: Using Local Knowledge to R

2021]

A STRANGE LAND AND A PECULIAR PROBLEM

95

bounds descriptions are not required to convey property; so long as
there is a way to reasonably ascertain the intended boundaries, a
court will not invalidate a conveyance for vagueness.160 Factor in
“Mother Hubbard” clauses, which “unequivocally expand[ ] the
conveyance to property beyond that specifically described in the
deed,”161 and the result leaves much clarity to be desired. With such
inherent ambiguity, property rights are often left open to interpretation, constantly putting landowners at risk of having their property
rights challenged.162
For Appalachians, the consequences of metes and bounds and
the accompanying loose legal requirements for property descriptions exacerbate an already self-defeating cycle: more rugged land
leads to more variation in property descriptions, which leads to
more catch-all provisions, which lead to more uncertainty, which
leads to more litigation.163 For a system seemingly dependent upon
landowners being able to know and define their rights, these inherent ambiguities and uncertainties create significant problems.
Thus, how one defines their land with respect to their surrounding
landscape is vital in understanding one’s legal property rights.
However, as noted above, how a person defines herself in relation
to her surrounding landscape is inherently linguistic, highly localized, and deeply cultural.164
2. Hillbilly Experts and the Need for Clarity
In response to the systemic ambiguities present in many Appalachian property descriptions, local knowledge and culture can provide
clarity where a deed may be unable to do so. After all, as noted
during a recent 2015 study of an Appalachian community on the
Virginia-West Virginia border,
boundaries thereof can be ascertained by the application of general rules, governing the
location of land conveyed by any deed’ is absolutely essential.”).
160. See Amos v. Coffey, 320 S.E.2d 335, 338 (Va. 1984) (giving effect to a deed conveying
lands not described in the deed).
161. Vicars v. First Va. Bank-Mountain Empire, 458 S.E.2d 293, 295 (Va. 1995).
162. See supra Parts II.B, II.C.
163. See Libecap & Lueck, supra note 3, at 451 (noting that metes and bounds property
descriptions often lead to more litigation over property disputes).
164. See supra Part III.A.
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[T]he people who reside [there] have a cultural attachment to
the [land] that is different from other areas here in the United
States.... [R]esearchers were told by many local residents about
how they knew every inch of their land and that they held those
lands in a special kind of reverence.165

Therefore, if there is an ambiguity in describing Appalachian
property, it should be left to the experts. Courts should rely on those
with generations of local knowledge and community-level cultural
attachment by creating a presumption in favor of localized place
names. In doing so, courts could simultaneously recognize the
inherent virtues of cultural attachment and provide clarity to
property transfers.166
A rule recognizing the cultural patchwork of importance overlaying property in Appalachia would more accurately reflect the
intentions of parties engaging in contracts over Appalachian
land—a principle that is supposed to be a “guiding light” for courts
and juries during the interpretive process.167 Because property
descriptions are inherently less reliable where terrain is more
rugged, this recognition would be especially valuable in the
culturally attached areas of Appalachia.168
A presumption in favor of local knowledge would reinforce the
social bonds within communities and sew certainty into property
conveyances.169 By encouraging, and often requiring, hands-on interaction with the land and its people, supplementing metes and
bounds descriptions with the objectively superior local knowledge

165. BENGSTON & AUSTIN, supra note 12, at 47.
166. See Brady, supra note 55, at 880-81 (noting that “rich, customized information about
land” carries intangible benefits for communities living in the area).
167. Amos v. Coffey, 320 S.E.2d 335, 337 (Va. 1984) (quoting Magann Corp. v. Elec. Works,
123 S.E.2d 377, 381 (Va. 1962)).
168. Libecap & Lueck, supra note 3, at 429 (finding that rectangular survey plots in rugged
areas were “less productive than they would have been under [the metes and bounds system]”).
169. See Brady, supra note 55, at 943-44 (explaining that maintaining a functional system
of customizable property descriptions relies on and reinforces the social connections that
convey local knowledge); see also Benito Arruñada, Evolving Practice in Land Demarcation,
77 LAND USE POL’Y 661, 664 (2018) (“[S]ocial consensus allows legal demarcation to produce
stronger, in rem, effects.”).
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and cultural attachment systems would foster far greater trust in
the system than relying upon the whims of federal registers.170
3. An Issue of Significance
The ability to define one’s location with respect to others and with
respect to one’s own surrounding landscape is both socially and
politically powerful.171 After all, a name is legitimacy.172 Rarely do
local residents (much less Appalachian hillbillies), however, have a
voice in shaping their cartographic boundaries, as “maps [are] tools
of power most commonly wielded by those with institutional
power.”173 Yet, “whether produced by a research institute, the
federal government, or an ordinary resident[,] ... [maps] are always
arbitrary, selective, and incomplete.”174 Moreover, the black and
white lines on a map leave no room for the complex human relationships and kinship networks that tie residents to their land and help
formulate their individual identities.175 When property boundaries
are interpreted from the perspectives of local residents, from those
who know and understand the land around them, courts are better
equipped to accurately effectuate transfers with ambiguous property
descriptions.176
170. See Brady, supra note 55, at 950 (“[W]hen incorporated into legal institutions,
[customization] can build trust in and demonstrate the value of legal processes and
requirements.”).
171. See Scales et al., supra note 16, at 91.
172. See U.S. BD. ON GEOGRAPHIC NAMES, USEFUL TIPS FOR APPLYING OFFICIAL GEOGRAPHIC NAMES IN FEDERAL PUBLICATIONS 1 (2016), https://geonames.usgs.gov/docs/pubs/
Official_Geog_Names_Fed_Pubs_factsheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/6VJD-X5BM] (“Geographic
names also carry great cultural significance. Using one name in preference to another can
even have political implications.”).
173. Scales et al., supra note 16, at 91.
174. Eugene J. McCann, Mapping Appalachia: Toward a Critical Understanding, 4 J.
APPALACHIAN STUD. 87, 87 (1998).
175. Id. at 95; see Berlin, supra note 48 (noting that National Geography Society’s Geographer believes “[p]lace names serve as a vehicle for identity”); see also Guy W. Buford,
Buford: Pipeline Could Endanger Appalachian Waters, ROANOKE TIMES (Sept. 17, 2015),
https://www.roanoke.com/opinion/commentary/buford-pipeline-could-endanger-appalachianwaters/article_6e207ad1-43d3-57b7-85c9-e308459ab6c5.html [https://perma.cc/EL2E-KJGS]
(“These Appalachian Mountains are populated by people, many of whom have been on this
land for generations and who have a cultural attachment to their land. This information does
not appear on Google Earth.”).
176. See Scales et al., supra note 16, at 91 (“[W]hen constructed from the perspectives of
local residents, [maps] can promote political projects.”).
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Some will ask why Appalachians cannot simply petition the BGN
to change inconsistent federal definitions to align with local names.
And while it is true that anyone can petition the BGN to change a
name,177 “changing a name merely to correct or re-establish
historical usage is not in and of itself a reason to change a name.”178
Notably, there have been a total of zero name-change petitions from
Southwest Virginia, West Virginia, or Eastern Kentucky in the last
twelve months.179 If one extends the search to include Eastern
Tennessee, only one natural feature has been renamed.180 This
silence is deafening. While it may be possible that residents in these
areas simply have not had a reason to change place names, it seems
more likely, given that the BGN receives hundreds of petitions per
year,181 that this virtual absence from the administrative process is
indicative of a larger problem of access that is once again leaving
Appalachians out of the mapmaking process.
An interpretation principle based on cultural attachment and
local knowledge would simultaneously recognize the importance of
place and culture in Appalachia while providing clarity and predictability to an otherwise ambiguous system.182 Hence, by integrating local knowledge with the larger property system as a whole,
local communities would be able to facilitate a more accurate
property system that not only mirrors the unique intrinsic value of
Appalachian land but also places the difficult issues of land
demarcation and deed interpretation back into the hands of the
experts: local residents.

177. DNC, supra note 40, at 27-31 (not restricting submission of proposals for place name
changes to any segment of the general public).
178. U.S. Board on Geographic Names: How Do I?, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV., https://www.
usgs.gov/core-science-systems/ngp/board-on-geographic-names/how-do-i [https://perma.cc/
7Q2N-M766]. In addition, the BGN typically does not approve “variant names,” which are
“current or historical name[s] or spelling[s] for a geographic feature other than its official
name.” DNC, supra note 40, at 17.
179. U.S. Board on Geographic Names: Action List, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV., https://geo
names.usgs.gov/apex/f?p=geonames_web:review_lists [https://perma.cc/5WUA-N86Y] (click
“Action List”).
180. Id. (changing a stream name due to its offensive nature).
181. See, e.g., U.S. BD. GEOGRAPHIC NAMES FISCAL YEAR 2018 ANN. REP. TO SEC’Y INTERIOR
3 (2018), https://geonames.usgs.gov/docs/pubs/BGN_AnnRpt_FY2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/
5YAD-PLLE].
182. See McCann, supra note 174, at 109.
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IV. ADDRESSING COUNTERARGUMENTS
Proponents of standardization in property law argue that “the
structur[al benefits] of standardization promote[ ] efficien[cy]” by
increasing “alienation, reducing [uncertainty], and managing thirdparty information costs.”183 These prostandardization scholars argue
that any introduction of inconsistency and specialization into
property creates high information costs that lower efficiency and
decrease property values.184 While valid in other contexts, such
concerns should not prevent application of this Note’s proposal, as
a presumption in favor of local knowledge would increase legitimacy, promote clarity, and further BGN interests.
A. Information Costs and the Impacts on Alienation
Perhaps the oldest justification for standardization in property
law is the idea that standardization promotes alienability by
lowering transaction costs.185 Well-known proponents of standardization, Professors Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith argued,
[T]hird parties must expend time and resources to determine the
attributes of [property] rights, both to avoid violating them and
to acquire them from present holders. The existence of unusual
property rights increases the cost of processing information
about all property rights. Those creating or transferring
idiosyncratic property rights cannot always be expected to take
these increases in measurement costs fully into account, making
them a true externality.186

183. Davidson, supra note 95, at 1624.
184. See Libecap & Lueck, supra note 3, at 428 (arguing that standardization in property
law leads to “lower transaction costs,” “better property rights enforcement,” and higher
property values).
185. Davidson, supra note 95, at 1598, 1624-25 (discussing justifications for the numerus
clausus principle, meaning the “number is closed,” which parallels arguments for
standardization in property law).
186. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 8 (2000).
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The thought is that standardization protects the interests of future
holders “by limiting the menu of possib[ilities]” for current landowners.187 The result, so the argument goes, is that property will be both
easier to sell and higher in value because the inevitable transaction
costs, such as costs of coordination, verification, and enforcement
between the parties, will be lower.188 This concern is particularly
potent in property law because of the desire for property to easily
flow to “the highest and best use.”189
As a preliminary matter, this reactionary justification for
standardization seemingly gives short shrift to the benefits of
notice.190 The presumption for which this Note argues does not seek
to introduce uncertainty into property conveyances, nor does it
create a new “form” of property.191 Rather, this Note offers a rule of
interpretation that would provide courts and juries with a reliable
reference point (local knowledge) for interpreting property descriptions with place-name ambiguity after the already-existent safeguards against ambiguity have failed.192 Thus, concerns of fragmentation and nonstandard transfers of property are de minimis in the
context of property descriptions.
Arguably, following federal definitions would promote efficiency
and alienability by providing an objective baseline for third
parties.193 Such reasoning fails for two reasons. First, in the context
of property descriptions, true adherence to the principles of
standardization would mean always using federal definitions of
property in cases of ambiguity. Given that the current property
system already allows parties to introduce extrinsic evidence to
support their interpretations, this “pure standardization” ship has
sailed, as juries may already choose to resolve ambiguous property
descriptions using local definitions instead of federal names if the
evidence supports such an interpretation.194
187. Davidson, supra note 95, at 1624-25.
188. Id.; see Merrill & Smith, supra note 186, at 24 (arguing that the “large transaction-cost
barriers” of specialization would “creat[e] an undue restraint on alienation”).
189. Davidson, supra note 95, at 1619.
190. See Davidson, supra note 95, at 1628-29 (admitting that notice can solve many of the
information-cost concerns raised by proponents of standardization).
191. See supra Part III.
192. See supra Part III.B.
193. See DNC, supra note 40, at 2.
194. See supra Parts II.A, II.B.
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Second, scholars readily admit that if two parties want to
structure a conveyance in a particular way, standardization does not
stop them; it only makes doing so harder and more expensive.195
Idiosyncrasies in property descriptions is a problem that the market
can work out more efficiently on its own, as any increase or decrease
in the variation between descriptions should be reflected in the
property’s price.196 But perhaps most importantly, as a matter of
policy, the local residents—people who have lived and died for
generations on the same farms or in the same counties—should get
the final say in determining where their land is.197
B. Combatting Local Abuse
Importantly, this Note’s proposed presumption would be rebuttable, not dispositive. Thus, regardless of whether a particular
landowner has a subjective understanding of their property, a
challenger would be able to overcome any local presumption by
showing that the intent of the parties was founded upon standardized boundaries. This system incentivizes both parties to have a
better drafting process before land transfers occur, as it is in neither
party’s best interests to purposefully create ambiguity in land
transfers.
However, some may still fear the potential for abuse if property
rights are contingent upon local residents defining local property.
While any system reliant upon local knowledge and cultural understanding assumes a rather homogeneous community,198 a local
jury is more apt to determine such factual disputes on a case-bycase basis than a state or federal legislator who has likely never
been to the county, much less the property, in question.199 Since
local understandings are, by definition, commonly known, the
195. See Davidson, supra note 95, at 1625-26; Merrill & Smith, supra note 186, at 24-25
(noting that if the goal of standardization is to limit idiosyncrasies in order to promote
efficiency, then it “is not in fact a very effective device” for doing so).
196. See Davidson, supra note 95, at 1626; see also Merrill & Smith, supra note 186, at 47
(explaining how market participants will often opt for a standard-like system even in the
absence of a legally imposed system due to the benefits of operating in a “network”).
197. See supra Parts III.B.2, III.B.3.
198. See McCann, supra note 174, at 110.
199. See supra Part I.A.
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likelihood of one person subverting this system is low. Therefore,
the fact that jurors are pulled from the surrounding area actually
helps prevent local abuse, as it would be difficult to convince a juror
to use an alleged common cultural understanding of which they
have never heard.200
C. Protecting the Integrity of the Standardized System
Skeptics may argue that deferring to local understandings would
undermine the purpose and goals of the BGN. However, while it is
true that this Note’s presumption would inevitably produce
outcomes that contradict federal definitions, such outcomes would
advance rather than detract from the BGN’s policies and procedures.201
First, if the purpose of place-name standardization is to provide
the clarity of a “common map,” then any contradictions merely work
to perfect the overall system. Theoretically, over time, as litigants
discover “local use” contradictions, these flaws in the common map
would be fixed through adoption by the BGN.202 Therefore, as
standardized boundaries began to be redrawn to conform with local
use, local knowledge, and place-based attachment systems, the
standardized system would become more accurate and such
discrepancies less common.
Moreover, it is important to note that the presumption for which
this Note argues would be limited in scope, as it would apply only
after a court has deemed a deed ambiguous on its face and the
place-naming procedures of the BGN have failed.203 Where the
language of a deed is clear and unambiguous, a court would still be
required to construe the terms according to their “plain meaning,”204
for it would be improper for a court to ignore the expressly stated
200. See KENT ET AL., supra note 14, at 4 (noting that cultural attachment requires active
participation by communities “to preserve their natural and social environment”).
201. See DNC, supra note 40, at 2-4, 7, 11 (noting that the “recognition of present-day local
usage” is a driving policy behind BGN decisions).
202. 43 U.S.C. § 364 (establishing the BGN to “provide for uniformity in geographic
nomenclature and orthography throughout the Federal Government”).
203. See DNC, supra note 40, at 2 (“A primary principle [of the BGN] is formal recognition
of present-day local usage.”).
204. Amos v. Coffey, 320 S.E.2d 335, 337 (Va. 1984) (citing Berry v. Klinger, 300 S.E.2d
792, 796 (Va. 1983)).
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intention of the parties by applying a contrary rule of construction.205
Therefore, for the majority of conveyances, a local presumption
would not disrupt the standardized system. In the event, however,
that the system fails and a court faces the decision of whether to use
a federal or local definition to resolve an ambiguity within a
property description, then this Note’s presumption in favor of local
knowledge could easily be employed in any dispute in order to
resolve the ambiguous description.
CONCLUSION
This Note draws attention to certain deficiencies that arise when
applying federal, standardized place names to Appalachian property
and corrects them by placing matters of unique importance back
into the hands of the experts: local residents.
The ability to define one’s property is essential to the proper
functioning of our property system.206 For many Appalachians,
however, this task is far easier said than done, as high mountain
peaks and low river valleys make demarcating physical boundaries
nearly impossible.207 The law has attempted to resolve these
systemic ambiguities by allowing for expansive “catch-all” clauses.208
Yet, taken to their logical end, these expansive phrases merely
replace ambiguous property descriptions with even more ambiguous
clauses. Courts and juries are then forced to make an impossible
decision between two competing and plausible interpretations, often
having to decide between that which is locally understood and that
which is federally defined. The result, at least in part, is largely an
arbitrary decision.
This Note proposes a clearer solution. When all other safeguards
have failed, the proper interpretation should rely upon local
knowledge rather than standardized maps, as local cultural
understandings will more accurately reflect the original intent of
the parties. First, by working and living in the same area over
205.
206.
207.
208.

See CNX Gas Co. v. Rasnake, 752 S.E.2d 865, 867 (Va. 2014).
See supra Part II.
See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part II.A.2.
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generations, local residents possess an objectively superior knowledge of the land around them. Second, Appalachians often possess
a high level of cultural attachment that is commonly expressed
through references to people and places in property descriptions.
Thus, more than just legal documents, deeds tell generational
stories that weave together complex webs of social and cultural
understandings.209
The proper solution thus lies in recognizing the importance of
place-based culture in Appalachia and appreciating the knowledge
that comes from that regional identity. No longer the wayfaring
hillbilly, such a rule empowers local residents, through their
objectively superior local knowledge and cultural awareness, to
reliably and accurately resolve a problem the law so far has
not—ambiguous property descriptions in Appalachia.
William L. Spotswood *

209. See STOLL, supra note 120, at 161 (“A deed might seem like an impersonal legal
instrument, but local deeds [tell] stories and trace[ ] the transfer of land between and within
families.”).
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